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OFF THE MAPPM PAROLE REVOCATION
HEARINGS AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole v. Scott,
118 S. Ct. 2014 (1998).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott,' the Su-
preme Court held that the exclusionary rule prohibiting the in-
troduction of illegally obtained evidence does not apply to
parole revocation proceedings.2 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court had proposed that the federal exclusionary rule should
apply when the officers conducting a search know that the sus-
pect is a parolee, on the grounds that excluding evidence in
those situations would deter deliberate Fourth Amendment vio-
lations.3 The Supreme Court rejected that proposal, arguing
that the deterrence value was slight.4 The Court reasoned that
courts should not apply the rule when the social costs of exclud-
ing inculpatory evidence outweigh the deterrence benefits. 5
Under the Court's analysis, parole revocation hearings are not
sufficiently similar to criminal prosecutions to warrant exclusion
as a remedy for illegal searches or seizures.'
This Note will first argue that the Court's rejection of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's rule represents another step in
its limitation of Fourth Amendment rights. The Court has
turned to cost-benefit principles in weighing the reach of the
exclusionary rule, ignoring the constitutional arguments that
led to its adoption, and has thereby produced an exclusionary





See id. at 2021.
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rule based solely on the Court's policy preferences. Second, this
Note will argue that the Court's cost-benefit analysis of Pennsyl-
vania's rule, which minimized deterrence benefits and exagger-
ated social costs, was faulty. Likewise, the Court missed the
parallels between parole revocation proceedings and criminal
trials. Third, this Note will argue that the Court broke with its
own precedent to strike down the rule, since the Court has re-
peatedly held that the good faith of the law enforcement officer
plays a part in determining whether courts should exclude evi-
dence. Yet the Court rejected a Pennsylvania test that hinged
on the officer's knowledge about whether the suspect was a pa-
rolee, a criterion that mirrors the good-faith exception that the
Court has upheld elsewhere. Finally, this Note will argue that
the fundamental limitation on parolees' Fourth Amendment
rights lies in Griffin v. Wisconsin7 and other decisions regarding
the rights of probationers and parolees, and that applying the
exclusionary rule to remedy Fourth Amendment violations,
even if theoretically appealing, would be largely futile when pa-
rolees have almost no substantive Fourth Amendment rights
anyway.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The Fourth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution provides
for security against unreasonable searches and seizures, setting
out warrant and probable cause requirements as restraints on
law enforcement. As with the rest of the Constitution, however,
the amendment specifies no remedies in the event of a viola-
tion, and legislatures have not, in the view of many commenta-
7483 U.S. 868 (1987).
" The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsr., amend. IV.
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tors, effectively filled that void.9 Courts have accordingly devel-
oped the doctrine that evidence seized in violation of the
Fourth Amendment's prohibitions is inadmissible in subsequent
criminal prosecutions. A recurring debate regarding the appli-
cation of the rule concerns whether the Constitution itself
mandates exclusion, or whether the rule as it stands is merely a
judicial remedy with no constitutional backing.
A strong belief that the Constitution requires the exclusionary
rule animated the Supreme Court's first statement on the sub-
ject in Weeks v. United States,10 when it ruled that "prejudicial er-
ror" occurs when a federal court allows evidence illegally seized
by a federal officer to be introduced at trial." Justice Day wrote
that, if courts admit illegally seized evidence at trial, the Fourth
Amendment's protections are "of no value,', 2 meaning that the
Constitution mandates rather than merely suggests the rule.
The Court's statement that "[t]o sanction such proceedings
would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect if not
an open defiance of the prohibitions of the Constitution" like-
wise suggests that the Constitution requires the rule and implic-
itly sets out a notion ofjudicial complicity.13 The Weeks decision
'A dissent in one pivotal exclusionary rule case observed that "[a]lternatives are
deceptive. Their very statement conveys the impression that one possibility is as effec-
tive as the next. In this case their statement is blinding. For there is but one alterna-
tive to the rule of exclusion. That is no sanction at all." Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25, 41 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting). See also People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905, 913
(Cal. 1955) (stating that "experience has demonstrated, however, that neither admin-
istrative, criminal nor civil remedies are effective in suppressing lawless searches and
seizures.")
o 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
"Id. at 398.
12 Id. at 393.
" Id. at 394. The Court's analysis referred several times to the holding in Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)). Boyd had merged the theories of the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments to rule that a defendant could not be compelled to incriminate
himself with his own property. 116 U.S. at 630. The Boyd Court called the offending
search "the invasion of [the] indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty,
and private property, where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of
some public offense." 116 U.S. at 630. In Weeks, the Court likewise invoked the sanc-
tity of private property, holding that "if letters and private documents can thus be
seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense," the
Fourth Amendment's protections are empty. 232 U.S. at 393. Boyd's expansive the-
ory of privacy and property rights eventually lost favor, however decisions like Schmer-
ber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 766-72 (1966), which upheld the extraction of a blood
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was silent regarding the deterrent value of the rule and its po-
tential to prevent police misconduct via the threat of exclusion,
but it clearly believed that the terms of the Fourth Amendment
demand that federal courts apply the rule.
Several decades passed before the Court considered the
rule's effect on the states, but in Wolf v. Colorado,14 the Court
held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to state prosecu-
tions.' 5 Integral to the Wolf holding was the Court's insistence
that the exclusionary rule is a remedy for Fourth Amendment
violations, not mandated by the Constitution itself; the Court in-
sisted that states should remain free to develop their own means
16
of deterring illegal searches and seizures. Since the Constitu-
tion requires no single remedy, states need not apply the exclu-
sionary rule, as long as "equally effective" remedies to
accomplish the same end are in place. 7 That requirement, in
theory, could have radically altered Fourth Amendment rights;
had states been forced to devise some system of police deter-
rence to head off illegal searches and seizures (or face the pros-
pect of having evidence excluded), criminal procedure would
have changed overnight. But the real effect of the decision was
simply to continue to allow the admission of illegally seized evi-
dence in state prosecutions.'8 The landscape changed slightly in
sample without consent, suggest that the Court no longer finds those principles com-
pelling. See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring) (a suspect's "(subjective) expectation of privacy" defines his Fourth Amendment
rights, so long as that expectation is "reasonable"); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27
(1968) (holding that a reasonableness calculus, rather than probable cause, governs
stop-and-frisk cases). The advent of the exclusionary rule coincided, therefore, with
an era in the Court's jurisprudence when notions of individual privacy held rather
more sway than they do today.
* 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
* Id. at 33 (1949). Wolfcame at a time when the Court was grappling with the ex-
tent to which the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the
provisions of the Bill of Rights; the holding in Wolf arguably speaks more to the
Court's Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence than to its view of the Fourth
Amendment.
" See generaly id. at 28-33.
17 Id. at 31.
SThe Wofholding also led to a practice in federal prosecutions known as the "sil-
ver platter" doctrine, under which state agents would obtain evidence illegally and
then give it to federal agents. Craig Hemmens & Rolando V. Del Carmen, The Exclu-
sionary Rule in Probation and Parole Revocation Hearings: Does It Apply?, 61 FED.
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1952, however, when the Court ruled that evidence gathered in
a manner that "shock[ed] the conscience" must be excluded
from state prosecuions.' 9 A shift back in the direction of Weeks
occurred in Elkins v. United States,20 which rested in part on the
"imperative of judicial integrity"2 ' and quoted Justice Brandeis's
dissent in Olmstead v. United States:. "In a government of laws, ex-
istence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe
the law scrupulously . . . If the Government becomes a law-
breaker, it breeds contempt for law., 22 Elkins therefore reaf-
firmed the theoretical constitutional basis for the exclusionary
rule, and set the stage for Mapp v. Ohio.
23
Mapp applied the exclusionary rule to the states via the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 4 Justice Clark,
writing for the Court, found that the factual bases for the Wolf
decision had vanished, and with them the reasoning for apply-
ing the Fourth Amendment to federal but not state prosecu-
tions.25 For example, while most states at the time of the Wolf
decision had declined to adopt the rule, several states had since
changed position and applied the rule, enough that the major-
ity now favored exclusion.26 The Mapp majority also rejected the
argument in Wolf that other remedies, such as a civil damages
remedy or internal police discipline proceedings, could ade-
quately safeguard Fourth Amendment rights.27 The Court relied
PROBATION 32, 32 (Sept. 1997). The practice was eventually overruled in Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), which held that illegally seized evidence could not
be used in federal prosecutions even if state officials performed the search and sei-
zure.
" Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952). Police officers forced a tube
into the suspect's stomach and poured an emetic solution through the tube to induce
vomiting. Id. at 161. They found morphine capsules in the vomited matter and used
them as evidence in the subsequent prosecution. Id. at 166.
364 U.S. 206 (1960).
"Id. at 223.
Id. (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
2367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2' Id. at 655.
2See id. at 653.
2See id. at 651.
27See id. at 652-53.
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in part on the decision in People v. Cahan,2 in which the Califor-
nia Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary rule.2' That hold-
ing rested in part on the finding that "civil actions against police
officers are rare" and "successful criminal prosecutions against
officers are nonexistent,"" meaning that two other primary ave-
nues for protection of Fourth Amendment rights are largely in-
effective. The Mapp Court echoed the argument in Weeks that
those rights are meaningless without an adequate remedy, stat-
ing that the rule is "an essential ingredient of the Fourth
Amendment.01  The Court in Mapp also recognized the deter-
rent aspect of the exclusionary rule, and argued that allowing
states to ignore the rule "encourage [d] disobedience to the fed-
eral Constitution." 2
The Court's subsequent decisions restricted the principle,
articulated in Weeks and reiterated in Mapp, that Fourth
Amendment rights required exclusion of illegally obtained evi-
dence.-' The Court ruled in United States v. Calandra3 that the
exclusionary rule does not apply to grand jury proceedings, rea-
soning in part that the deterrent value of excluding such evi-
2' 282 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1955).
9 Id. at 911.
lId. at 913.
"Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651.
'2 Id. at 657.
Id. at 655. Mapp had not, of course, explicitly applied the rule to proceedings
other than criminal prosecutions, but the principle set down in its holding addresses
general constitutional requirements rather than details specific to that context:
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable
against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is
enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Fed-
eral Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance
against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless
and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so
too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephem-
eral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish
means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court's high regard as a freedom "im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty."
Id. As the Court's decisions in Calandra, Stone and Leon all distanced themselves from
the language in Mapp that identified the source of the rule as the Fourth Amendment
itself, they effectively restricted the scope of that decision.
" 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
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dence is slight, and that applying the rule would unacceptably
disrupt the grand jury process."" The Court reasoned further
that admitting illegally seized evidence is "only a derivative use
of the product" of a prior illegal act, and as such "work[s] no
new Fourth Amendment wrong.06 That argument led to the
holding that the rule is a 'judicially created remedy designed to
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its de-
terrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the
party aggrieved." 7 The Calandra court looked to Elkins for sup-
port of its argument that the function of the rule is to deter,3
even though Mapp, which succeeded Elkins, had emphasized ju-
dicial integrity over deterrence, and even though Elkins had re-
lied on the language in Weeks that articulated the integrity of the
judiciary as a basis for the exclusionary rule.39 Justice Brennan's
Calandra dissent noted the majority's clear conflict with Mapp's
reasoning, and argued that the "imperative of judicial integrity"
articulated in Elkins demands that the judiciary avoid endorsing
police misconduct.40 The Court later ruled in Stone v. Powell,W '
relying on Calandra,2 that federal courts, in reviewing habeas
corpus petitions, need not undertake collateral review of Fourth
Amendment claims, on grounds that the deterrent effects of
Id. at 349-52.
Id. at 354.
7 Id. at 348. Mapp's majority had included Justice Black, who wrote separately to
argue that the Boyd merger of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments is necessary to bar
the introduction of illegally seized evidence, and that the Fourth Amendment stand-
ing alone does not justify the rule. 367 U.S. at 661-66 (Black, J., concurring). Argua-
bly, that might weaken the basis for Mapp, since the Boyd approach is no longer
followed, and give credence to an argument that Mapp's holding does not bind later
courts. In fact, however, neither Calandra nor its progeny referred to Justice Black's
opinion or argued that point, so the Court seems to have accepted the Mapp plurality
as a majority.
-"414 U.S. at 347.
29 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 208-10 (1960). The Elkins Court quoted as
support for its decision the reasoning in Weeks that the Fourth Amendment's protec-
tions, without the safeguard of the exclusionary rule, are "of no value." Id. at 209
(quoting Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914)).
40 Calandra, 414 U.S. at 360-61 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Elkins, 364 U.S. at
222).




such a review are insignificant.43  Pragmatic considerations of
administrative efficiency rather than substantive Fourth
Amendment concerns again carried the day. Justice Brennan in
dissent again criticized the majority for ignoring the constitu-
tional basis for Mapp."
Elkins's "imperative of judicial integrity" received even
shorter shrift in United States v. Leon,4 which modified the exclu-
sionary rule to allow for reliance in good faith on a defective
search warrant.46  Leon, following Calandra and Stone, empha-
sized the rule's deterrent objectives and held that courts should
not suppress evidence produced by a search for which there is
an objective good-faith basis. Leon relied on decisions denying
48
retroactive application of Fourth Amendment watershed cases;
included in that analysis was Linkletter v. Walker49 which refused
to apply Mapp retroactively." Justice Brennan's dissent observed
that the deterrent effects of the exclusionary rule are supposed
to operate throughout the institution of government, not
merely on those officers who are carrying out searches.5' Ex-
cluding the illegally obtained evidence might have encouraged
the police department to ensure that a future warrant would be
legitimate. 2 Leon therefore signaled that the deterrence calcu-
43Id. at 493-95.
4 Id. at 509-510 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
4'468 U.S. 897 (1984).
46 Id. at 905.
4 Id. at 922-23. An officer had carried out an illegal search in reliance on a defec-
tive warrant. Id. at 903-04. Eighteen states have refused to apply Leon on grounds
that it conflicts with state statutes or state constitutions, however. See KevinJ. Heller &
John P. Reichmuth, 22 CHMPIOIN 18, 18 (Feb. 1998).
4'468 U.S. at 912.
49 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
0 Id. at 640.
-" Id. at 953-54 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
-2 Id. at 955 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan referred to an article by
formerJustice Stewart, which argued in part:
[T]he exclusionary rule is not designed to serve a "specific deterrence" function;
that is, it is not designed to punish the particular police officer for violating a person's
fourth amendment rights. Instead, the rule is designed to produce a "systematic deter-
rence": the exclusionary rule is intended to create an incentive for law enforcement of-
ficials to establish procedures by which police officers are trained to comply with the
fourth amendment because the purpose of the criminal justice system-bringing crimi-
1054 [Vol. 89
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lus hinges on the conduct of the individual officer, not on the
costs to the system as a whole.
B. PROBATION AND PAROLE
Black's Law Dictionary defines parole as a "release from jail,
prison or other confinement after actually serving part of sen-
tence," or a "conditional release from imprisonment which enti-
ties parolee to serve remainder of his term outside confines of
an institution, if he satisfactorily complies with all terms and
conditions provided in parole order."5 3 The Supreme Court has
called parole an "established variation on imprisonment of con-
victed criminals" and emphasized the conditions that the pa-
rolee must observe once released from prison.5  Moreover,
parolees are not entitled to the "full panoply of rights" available
to a defendant in a criminal prosecution, because a convicted
criminal does not have the same rights as an ordinary citizen.55
Parole revocation deprives a parolee "not of the absolute liberty
to which every citizen is entitled, but only of the conditional lib-
erty properly dependent on observance of special parole restric-
0,6tions. Parolees do, however, retain due process rights: both
the parolee's interests in having a fair hearing and the state's
rights in effecting rehabilitation require that procedural guar-
antees be observedY. Probation revocation, which the Court has
repeatedly described as analogous to parole revocation,5 8 results
in a "loss of liberty" and therefore requires due process.5 9 Like-
wise, parole boards must provide counsel in some situations:
nals to justice--can be achieved only when evidence of guilt may be used against defen-
dants.
Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Fu-
ture of the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure Cases, 83 COLuM. L. REV. 1365, 1400
(1983).
"s BLACK'S LAw DIacoNARY 1116 (6th ed. 1990).
"Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972).
"Id. at 480.
5 Id.
57 Id. at 483-84.
"See, e.g., Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 118 S. Ct. 2014 (1998);
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
'9 Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782.
1999] 1055
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Mempa v. Rha 6 stipulated that an indigent must have counsel at
sentencing even when the process is part of a probation revoca-
tion proceeding, 1 and Gagnon v. Scarpelli2 found that there are
some cases in which "fundamental fairness" requires the ap-
pointment of counsel.
63
Several theories have guided the Court's holdings on parol-
ees' and probationers' rights. 6 One theory is the "constructive
custody" concept, elaborated in People v. Hernandez,5 which held
that the parolee, although technically free, is "constructively a
prisoner," and probable cause for searches is hence unneces-
sary.r Since the parolee is still legally a prisoner, he may be re-
turned to prison without notice or hearing.67 Commentators
have criticized this theory as justifying excessive intrusions into
parolees' privacy, and as ignoring the rehabilitative goals of pa-
role that expect parolees to live normal lives, not those of pris-
oners on a long leash. 6 Morrissey rejected constructive custody,
saying that "the argument cannot even be made here" that su-
pervising parolees presents the same exigent circumstances as
controlling actual prisoners.6 9 Other notions include the "act of
grace" theory, under which the probationer cannot object to in-
trusions into his privacy because parole is a gift of the state,7o
and the "waiver" theory, which supposes that probationers waive
their constitutional protections when they accept parole, de-
pending on the nature of the conditions of the parole agree-
ment.7' Morrissey rejected the "act of grace" theory as well,
w 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
61 Id. at 137.
62 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
Id. at 790.
See 4 WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SEARcH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 10.10, at 758 (3rd ed. 1996).
40 Cal. Rptr. 100 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
66 Id. at 103-05.
67 Id. at 103.
"See generally Welsh S. White, The Fourth Amendment Rights of Parolees and Probation-
ers, 31 U. Prrr. L. REV. 167 (1969); William R. Rapson, Note, Extending Search-and-
Seizure Protection to Parolees in California, 22 STAN. L. REv. 129 (1969).
61 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483 (1972).
70 4LAFAvE, supra note 64, § 10.10(b), at 761.
M4 id. § 10.10(b) at 763-64.
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noting that "[i]t is hardly useful any longer to try to deal with
this problem in terms of whether the parolee's liberty is a 'right'
or a 'privilege.' By whatever name, the liberty is valuable and
must be seen as within the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment."72  Hernandez likewise observed that the "act of
grace" theory raises the possibility that the state is attaching un-
constitutional conditions to a grant of state privileges.73 Courts
have not raised the same concern regarding the waiver theory,
though, despite the implications of a far-reaching waiver of
rights in exchange for a benefit.74 The Court's ruling in Zap v.
United State 5 provided for waivers of Fourth Amendment
rights,76 and no subsequent decision has questioned whether
those waivers are valid.7
The parole revocation process involves first, a "preliminary
hearing" to determine whether there is probable cause or rea-
sonable grounds to believe that the parolee has violated the pa-
role conditions. 7' Due process under Morrissey's analysis
requires that an independent adjudicator, or panel of adjudica-
tors, examine the facts and make the revocation decision,
though the adjudicator need not be a judge; another parole of-
ficer could serve adequately.7 Morrissey also required that the
parole board give the parolee notice of the hearing, so that he
can testify, produce witnesses, and offer evidence. s Moreover,
the board must allow a parolee the opportunity to cross-
examine adverse witnesses.81 Should the adjudicator find prob-
7
'Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).
People v. Hernandez, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100, 103 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
744LAFAVE, supra note 64, § 10.10(b), at 763-64.
7' 328 U.S 624 (1946).
71 Id. at 628, vacated by Zap v. United States, 330 U.S. 800 (1947). Though the
judgment in the first Zap decision was vacated one year later, it has been cited as con-
trolling law many times since then by the Supreme Court and by lower courts. It
therefore appears to remain good law. See, e.g., Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 736
(1983); United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 806 (1974); Schneckloth v. Bus-
tamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); United States v. Picariello, 568 F.2d 222, 225 (1st
Cir. 1978); United States v. Griffin, 555 F.2d 1323, 1325 (5th Cir. 1977).
'4 LAFAVE, supra note 64, § 10.10(b), at 764.
' Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471, 485 (1972).
7 Id. at 485-86.
Id. at 486-87.
S Id. at 487.
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able cause to revoke parole at the initial hearing, an impartial
body such as a parole board must then evaluate all the con-
tested relevant facts and consider whether those facts warrant
revocation. 2 The board must produce a written statement de-
tailing the evidence upon which it relied and its reasons for re-
voking parole.8 3 Though the Morrissey opinion emphasized that
this hearing is not equivalent to a criminal prosecution, the due
process requirements-written notice to the parolee of the
grounds for the proposed revocation, disclosure of the evidence
against him, the opportunity to testify and to present witnesses
on his behalf, the opportunity to confront adverse witnesses, an
independent judicial body-suggest several parallels.4 The
Court also noted, however, that the proceedings are flexible
enough to accommodate evidence that would normally violate
the hearsay rule.8
The rights of parolees and probationers have been scaled
back since Morrissey. The Court ruled in Griffin v. Wsconsin6
that a warranfless search of a probationer's residence with "rea-
sonable grounds" for suspicion rather than probable cause is
permissible as long as it is conducted under a regulation that
satisfies Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" standards. 7 The
Griffin majority relied on dicta in Morrissey to reinforce its claim
that probationers and parolees have inferior rights, and that a
state need satisfy only a relatively low standard to justify infring-
ing those rightse The Court drew on a concurrence in another
case that had allowed exceptions to warrant and probable-cause
82 Id. at 488.
83 Id. at 489.
8' Id.
"Id.
483 U.S. 868 (1987).
Id. at 872. See also ThomasJ. Bamonte, The Viability ofMorrissey v. Brewer and the
Due Process Rights of Paroles and Other Conditional Releasees, 18 S. ILL. U.LJ. 121, 148-49
(1993).
"Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873-74. The Griffin majority also noted that since probation
represents one point on a continuum of punishments, from fines or community serv-
ice to permanent imprisonment, the state can restrict the probationer's freedom as
needed. Id. at 874. That reasoning recalls the assumption that constitutional protec-
tions in this context are privileges rather than rights, which Morrissey had taken pains
to reject. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482.
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requirements on grounds of "special needs" of the law enforce-
ment system in question." The "special needs" of the Wisconsin
probationary system, as articulated by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, therefore controlled and made the warrant requirement
impracticable.9 For example, according to the Court, supervi-
sion of a probationer is a "special need" requiring that parole
officers be permitted to impinge on probationers' privacy.9'
The theory underlying Griffin's analysis was therefore an "ad-
ministrative search" rationale, under which, following the stan-
dards of Camara v. Municipal Court,92 a search is permissible if
"reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conduct-
ing an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular
dwelling."93 Since the Griffin search was conducted pursuant to
rather draconian state regulations, notably that no consent is
needed for a home search of a parolee or probationer as long as
there are "reasonable grounds,"9 it is unclear what that case im-
plies for searches performed without such regulations. Mostju-
risdictions have interpreted Griffin as holding that the
conditions of parole or probation define "reasonable cause" for
any given search, though a few have made "reasonable cause" a
standard in itself, independent of the parole conditions.95
89 Giffin, 483 U.S. at 873 (quoting NewJersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985)
(Blackmun, J., concurring)).
'" Id. at 875-76.
9"Id. at 876.
"387 U.S. 523 (1967).
93 Id. at 538.
Griffin, 483 U.S. at 870-71. The Court ruled that the regulation "satisfies the
Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement under well-established principles,"
though it did not hypothesize regulations that would run afoul of that requirement.
Id. at 873. It is worth wondering whether, given the decline of substantive due proc-
ess, the Court would be inclined to overrule any state regulations regarding parole
conditions.
9See Hemmens & Del Carmen, supra note 18, at 34. The Griffin approach re-
flected a trend in the Court's decisions that looked to state law to define parolees'
and probationers' liberties. For example, Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correc-
tional Complex defined prisoners' liberty interests by language in a state statute that
mandated that prisoners eligible for parole be released barring specific findings to
the contrary. 442 U.S. 1, 11 (1979). Likewise, Oim v. Wakinekona found that states do
not infringe constitutionally protected liberty interests by failing to set limits on a
state's authority to transfer a prisoner out of state. 461 U.S. 238, 244-48 (1983). See
Bamonte, supra note 87, at 142-43.
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At the time of the Court's Scott decision, lower courts were
split among several alternatives regarding the application of the
exclusionary rule to parole and probation hearings, and the
Court had denied certiorari in several cases that addressed this
issue. Eleven states and four circuits had ruled that the exclu-
sionary rule does not apply to parole and probation revocation
96hearings. Five states and two circuits had ruled that the exclu-
sionary rule does apply to those proceedings,97 though eighteen
more states and four circuits had applied the rule with excep-
tions. For example, Alaska, Massachusetts, Michigan, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, and the Ninth Circuit had ruled that the
exclusionary rule does not apply if a police officer is unaware
that the suspect is a parolee. 98 Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado,
Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Oklahoma, Virginia, Washington,
and the Fifth and Sixth Circuits had ruled that the rule applies
when the search is conducted in bad faith, for example when of-
ficers conduct a search expressly to find cause for revocation, or
' See United States v. Finney, 897 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Baz-
zano, 712 F.2d 826 (3rd Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Mollica v. United States, 465
U.S. 1078 (1984); United States v. Frederickson, 581 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Hill, 447 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1971); State v. Alfaro, 623 P.2d 8 (Ariz. 1980); In
reTyrellJ., 876 P.2d 519 (Cal. 1994), cert denied sub nom. TyreIlJ. v. California, 514
U.S. 1068 (1995); Dulin v. State, 346 N.E.2d 746 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976); Tiryung v.
Commonwealth, 717 S.W.2d 503 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Thorsness, 528 P.2d 692
(Mont. 1974); Stone v. Shea, 304 A.2d 647 (N.H. 1973); State ex reL Wright v. Ohio
Adult Parole Authority, 661 N.E.2d 728 (Ohio 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 127
(1996); State v. Spratt, 386 A.2d 1094 (RI. 1978); Barker v. State, 483 S.W.2d 586
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1972); Hughes v. Gwinn, 290 S.E.2d 5 (W.Va. 1982); Gronski v.
State, 700 P.2d 777 (Wyo. 1985).
' SeeUnited States v. Rea, 678 F.2d 382 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Workman,
585 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1978); State v. Cross, 487 So.2d 1056 (Fla. 1986), cert dismissed,
479 U.S. 805 (1986); Amiss v. State, 219 S.E.2d 28 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975); People ex rel.
Piccarillo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 397 N.E.2d 354 (N.Y. 1979); State ex rel.Ju-
venile Dep't v. Rogers, 836 P.2d 127 (Or. 1992) (holding that the exclusionary rule
applies to violations of a state constitutional provision that exactly duplicates the
Fourth Amendment); Mason v. State, 838 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. App. 1992).
" See U.S. v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1975); State v. Sears, 553 P.2d 907
(Alaska 1976); Commonwealth v. Olsen, 541 N.E.2d 1003 (Mass. 1989); People v.
Perry, 505 N.W.2d 909 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Lombardo, 295 S.E.2d 399
(N.C. 1982); Scott v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole, 698 A.2d 32, 32 (Pa.
1997), rev d, 118 S. Ct. 2014 (1998).
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is intended to harass a suspect.99 The case law in eight states was
unsettled, '00 and eight states (Hawaii, Minnesota, North Dakota,
Nevada, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Vermont), and
three circuits (the First, Eleventh, and D.C.) had not ruled on
the issue.
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
After pleading no/o contendere to a charge of third-degree
murder and serving ten years in a Pennsylvania prison on a ten-
to twenty-year term, Keith Scott was released on parole on Sep-
tember 1, 1993.101 His parole agreement provided that he would
not own or possess firearms or other weapons, and subjected
him to warrantless searches of his person and property 2 It also
stipulated that any evidence of a violation was subject to seizure
and admission as evidence in a parole revocation hearing.' 3
" See United States v. Farmer, 512 F.2d 160 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. Brown,
488 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1973); Ex parteCaffie, 516 So.2d 831 (Ala. 1987); Harris v. State,
606 S.W.2d 93 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980); People v. Ressin, 620 P.2d 717 (Colo. 1980);
State v. Jacobs, 641 A.2d 1351 (Conn. 1994); Thompson v. United States, 444 A.2d
972 (D.C. 1982); People v. Stewart, 610 N.E.2d 197 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Kain v. State,
378 N.W.2d 900 (Iowa 1985); State v. Turner, 891 P.2d 317 (Kan. 1995); State v.
Davis, 375 So.2d 69 (La. 1979); State v. Caron, 334 A.2d 495 (Me. 1975) (declining to
apply the rule, but suggesting in a footnote that evidence of harassment by law en-
forcement would signal a need for a change in policy); Chase v. State, 522 A.2d 1348
(Md. 1987); Richardson v. State, 841 P.2d 603 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992); Anderson v.
Commonwealth, 470 S.E.2d 682 (Va. 1995); State v. Lampman, 724 P.2d 1092 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1986).
10 See Brown v. State, 249 A.2d 269 (Del. 1968) (a revocation must rest on admissi-
ble evidence); State v. Pinson, 657 P.2d 1095 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983) (warrantless
searches are permissible only if based on reasonable grounds); Brandt v. Percich, 507
S.W.2d 951 (Mo. CL App. 1974) (failure to observe probationer's due process rights
overturns revocation); State v. Aulrich, 308 N.W.2d 739 (Neb. 1981) (exclusionary
rule operates for probationers upon violation of a wiretap statute); State v. Reyes, 504
A.2d 43 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (revocation of probation must be based on
competent and credible evidence); State v. Vigil, 643 P.2d 618 (N.M. CL App.
1982) (inadmissible hearsay insufficient to justify revocation of probation); Layton
City v. Peronek, 803 P.2d 1294 (Utah CL App. 1990) (due process denied when a pro-
bation revocation did not rest on competent evidence); State v. West, 517 N.W.2d 482
(Wis. 1994) (evidence is admissible if the search is based on reasonable cause), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 955 (1994).
' Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 118 S. CL 2014, 2018 (1998).
lot Id.
" Id. The language of the agreement, in pertinent part, was as follows:
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Scott resided with his mother and stepfather following his re-
lease.
Five months later, Pennsylvania parole officers arrested
Scott on a warrant charging, among other claims, that he pos-
sessed two handguns in violation of his parole.' M Scott gave the
keys to his residence to an officer, who gave them to Scott's
companion, Dorothy Hahn, and the parole officers followed
Hahn to Scott's residence.' °5 On the officers' instructions, she
unlocked the door, and the officers entered. 10 6 Hahn then
called Scott's mother and waited for her to arrive. 7 When she
did, the officers told her that they were conducting a search of
Scott's bedroom; they did not request consent, and she did not
give it, though she did show them where the bedroom was. °0
When they found no evidence of a violation in the bedroom,
they searched the mother's sitting room, without requesting her
permission, and found several weapons, though none of them
matched the descriptions of the weapons named in the war-
rant.10 9
At Scott's parole revocation hearing, the guns found in the
sitting room were admitted into evidence despite Scott's argu-
ment that the search of the sitting room violated his Fourth
Amendment rights."0 Additionally, Scott's stepfather testified
that they belonged to him, and Scott denied knowing that the
guns were there.' An officer asserted the right to search com-
mon areas as well as Scott's room, based on a tip about weapons
I expressly consent to the search of my person, property and residence, without a war-
rant by agents of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole. Any items, in [sic]
the possession of which constitutes a violation of parole/reparole shall be subject to sei-
zure, and may be used as evidence in the parole revocation process.
668 A.2d 590, 597 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995).
'04 Scott v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole, 698 A.2d 32, 33 (Pa. 1997),






,,0 Scott v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole, 668 A.2d 590, 593-94 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1995), afd, 698 A.2d 32 (Pa. 1997), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 2014 (1998).
. Id. at 593.
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concealed in the house, but could not identify the source of that
information." The parole board sentenced Scott to serve the
remainder of his sentence along with three years' back time,
and denied his initial appeal.118
Scott then successfully appealed to the Pennsylvania Com-
monwealth Court: the court found the seizure of the weapons
unconstitutional and ruled that the evidence, as the fruit of a
warrantless and nonconsensual search, should have been sup-
pressed."" The court reasoned that, since the officers did not
tell Scott's mother that they intended to search common areas
as well as his bedroom, there was no consent.115 Moreover, ab-
sent a reasonable "statutory or regulatory framework" granting
the officer authority to search the common areas without con-
sent, such a search is unconstitutional." 6 An en banc review of a
separate case overruled the decision on grounds that the exclu-
sionary rule did not apply to parole revocation hearings." 7 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the original decision,
holding that Scott had a protected privacy expectation in his
home,"" that his consent was only to reasonable searches,"9 and
that there was insufficient evidence to warrant the search.'
20
Though the court ordinarily did not apply the exclusionary rule
to parole revocation proceedings, it ruled that situations where
officers know that a suspect is a parolee call for application of
the rule and exclusion of illegally seized evidence. The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
2 Scott, 698 A.2d at 33-34.
"s Id. at 34.
114Id.
'5 Scott, 668 A.2d at 597.
116 Id.
' Kyte v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole, 680 A.2d 14, 16-17 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1996) (en banc), overuled by Scott v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole, 698
A.2d 32, (Pa. 1997), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 2014 (1998).
" Scott, 698 A.2d at 35.
"9 Id. at 35-36. The court ruled that "reasonable" searches must be based on rea-
sonable suspicion and be reasonably related to the officer's duty. Applying that test,
it found that the search of Scott's home was based on mere speculation rather than
reasonable suspicion. Id. at 36.
2 Id.
" Id. at 37-39.
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whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applied to
parole revocation hearings.
IV. SUMMARY OF THE OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, holding that parole boards
are not required by the Constitution to exclude illegally ob-
tained evidence.2 In addition, the Court refused to adopt the
approach proposed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, under
which police officers who know that a suspect is a parolee or
probationer would be bound by the exclusionary rule.2
Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas began his analysis
by emphasizing that, when illegally obtained evidence is used
against a defendant, the constitutional violation lies in the un-
lawful search rather than in the use of such evidence.'1 Hence,
according to the Court, excluding illegally obtained evidence
cannot cure the violation and should be considered only as a
means of deterrence. 6 The Court looked for support to Calan-
dra, in which the Court had noted that the exclusionary rule
applies only when "its remedial objectives are thought most effi-
caciously served." ' 2 As such, the rule should operate only where
it would significantly deter illegal searches and seizures, and
when such deterrence benefits would outweigh its social costs.
The Court briefly reviewed other settings in which it has
ruled that the exclusionary rule does not apply.'28 For instance,
Calandra established that the rule does not apply to grand jury
'2 Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 2017-18 (1998).
'2' Id. at 2020. Scott had argued that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision
regarding Scott's consent to warrantless searches dealt only with state law and there-
fore fell outside the Court's jurisdiction. Id. at 2019 n.3. The Court, however, ruled
only on the applicability of the exclusionary rule and declined to consider whether
Scott's consent was sufficient to justify the search. id
124 Id. at 2022.
,2' Id. at 2019.
126 Id.
'2 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
1'2 Scott, 118 S. Ct. at 2019-20.
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hearings because of the unique role of those proceedings in the
law enforcement process.'2 Civil tax proceedings and civil de-
portation proceedings likewise need not exclude illegally ob-
tained evidence.3 0 In those decisions, the Court focused on the
high societal costs of excluding pertinent evidence.'
The Court then argued that applying the exclusionary rule
to parole and probation revocation hearings would likewise
burden them unacceptably. First, the Court contended that the
costs associated with excluding evidence in parole revocation
proceedings are significant.3 2 Quoting Morrissey, which called
parole a "variation on imprisonment of convicted criminals,'
3 3
the Court posited that the state has a strong interest in ensuring
that parolees do not violate the terms of their parole. 4 Exclud-
ing evidence that would demonstrate a parole violation would
hamper the enforcement of those terms, an especially serious
consequence, the Court reasoned, since parolees are more
likely to commit crimes than are ordinary citizens.
3 5
Second, argued the Court, parole revocation proceedings
are administrative processes incompatible with the assumptions
of the exclusionary rule. In the Court's view, parole revoca-
tion deprives the parolee of a "conditional" freedom, as op-
posed to the ordinary citizen's freedom.37 Moreover, parole
boards are not composed ofjudges, and traditional rules of evi-
dence do not apply.3 8 In that light, applying the rule would
turn the parole revocation process into "trial-like proceedings"
that would neglect the needs of the parolee and encourage pa-
Calandra, 414 U.S. at 349.
See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (holding that civil deportation
proceedings are insufficiently similar to criminal prosecutions to require the exclu-
sionary rule); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (holding that where there is
no federal participation in illegal activity, a federal civil tax proceeding need not ex-
clude illegally obtained evidence).
"' Scott, 118 S. Ct. at 2020.
"'Id.
"'Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972).
" Scott, 118 S. Ct. at 2020.
135 Id.
" Id. at 2020-21.
"
7 Id. at 2020 (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480.)
" Id. at 2021.
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role boards to reincarcerate parolees rather than tolerate mar-
ginal infractions.39 Alternatively, the Court noted, in light of
the increased social and financial costs of the revocation proc-
ess, states might be reluctant to allow paroles at all.140 Drawing
on Morrissey's holding that states have an "overwhelming inter-
est" in maintaining informal, administrative parole revocation
procedures, 41 the Court stated that it is "simply unwilling so to
intrude into the States' correctional schemes" by declaring the
rule applicable.
Finally, the Court claimed that the deterrence value of the
rule in this context was minimal.' 3 The Court agreed with the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court that the rule would make little dif-
ference in situations where the officer was unaware that the sus-
pect was a parolee, but then argued against making distinctions
based on the officer's knowledge.4  A police officer is focused
on "obtaining convictions of those who commit crimes,"' 4 the
Court reasoned, so deterrence will be effective even when a
revocation hearing rather than a criminal prosecution awaits.
4 6
When a parole officer performs a search, on the other hand, the
Court decided that other deterrents, such as departmental dis-
cipline and the possibility of damages suits, suffice to deter ille-
gal searches. 47 Since a parole officer's relationship with a
parolee is "more supervisory than adversarial," 4 1 concluded the





.4 Morissey, 408 U.S. at 483.
142 Scott, 118 S. Ct. at 2021.
' Id. at 2021-22.








B. JUSTICE SOUTER'S DISSENT
Justice Souter'50 dissented from the Court's judgment, argu-
ing that the Court misunderstood the function of the revocation
process, and hence the necessity of effective deterrence of ille-
gal searches and seizures in that context.' 1 Justice Souter began
his dissent by noting that the basis for deciding whether the ex-
clusionary rule should apply to a proceeding lies in its potential
deterrent effect, and in the likelihood that the marginal deter-
rent benefit would outweigh the costs. 5'
Justice Souter next observed that the Court's analysis of the
marginal deterrence benefits of applying the exclusionary rule
to parole revocation hearings rested on "erroneous views of the
roles of regular police and parole officers in relation to revoca-
tion proceedings."' 5 Justice Souter argued that police more of-
ten than not know a parolee's status when they conduct a
search, and that such knowledge is significant in several re-
spects.5 If police officers know that evidentiary restrictions are
in force, they will hesitate to conduct illegal searches and sei-
zures for fear of 'Jeopardizing" a parolee's reincarceration.'5
Since a formal trial is often far less likely than a revocation hear-
ing in those situations, police officers need not worry about en-
dangering a prosecution.5 6  In response to the Court's
argument that the respective functions of parole and police of-
ficers differ, Justice Souter referred to several theorists who see
the parole officer as filling the role of a policeman for a pa-
rolee. 7 Finally, Justice Souter observed that the other mecha-
nisms supposedly in place to deter overzealous parole officers
are not, in fact, used: the Court mentioned no instances in
which parole officers were disciplined for abusing their discre-
'"Justices Ginsburg and BreyerjoinedJustice Souter's dissent.
"' Id. at 2023 (SouterJ., dissenting).
"'Id. (SouterJ., dissenting).
113 Id. at 2024 (SouterJ., dissenting).
"AId. at 2024-25 (SouterJ., dissenting).
"'Id. (SouterJ., dissenting).
"'Id. (SouterJ., dissenting).
117 Id. at 2025-26 (SouterJ., dissenting).
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tion, or any lawsuit for damages brought by a parolee against a
parole officer. 58
Justice Souter then argued that the Court's cost-benefit
analysis was flawed, in that it both exaggerated the cost of apply-
ing the rule to revocation hearings and minimized the potential
benefits to the parolee.159 He rejected the view that enhancing
the adversary nature of the parole revocation process was a sig-
nificant detriment to applying the rule °0 He explained that
"9any revocation hearing is adversary to a degree" in that counsel
must be appointed whenever there are complicated factual is-
sues.61 In a short footnote, Justice Souter admitted that the
state does have a strong interest in ensuring that parolees com-
ply with the conditions of their parole, but pointed out that
such an interest is analogous to the state's interest in convicting
criminals in prosecutions, and should therefore defer to the
Fourth Amendment in the same way.16 2 As for the benefits of
applying the rule to the parole revocation process, Justice
Souter argued that the state often pursues parole revocation in
lieu of a new criminal prosecution, since such an approachvois prcedual - . 163
avoids procedural complications. For example, the state need
not demonstrate proof beyond a reasonable doubt to obtain a
recommitment. Justice Souter portrayed the suppression
remedy of the exclusionary rule as the sole deterrent to Fourth
Amendment violations in the parole-revocation context.
16
Justice Souter ended by observing that Scott's consent to the
search of his "person, property and residence" was insufficient
to waive the requirement that searches be based on a reasonable
suspicion, and that Scott's Fourth Amendment rights were
"' Id. at 2026 (SouterJ., dissenting).
"'Id. (SouterJ., dissenting).
'
60 Id. at 2026-27 (SouterJ., dissenting).
161 Id. at 2027 (SouterJ., dissenting).
112 Id. at 2027 n.2 (SouterJ., dissenting).
" Id. at 2027 (SouterJ., dissenting).
Id. (Souter,J., dissenting).
'6 Id. (SouterJ., dissenting).
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therefore violated.'6 He would have affirmed the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's decision.167
C. JUSTICE STEVENS' DISSENT
Justice Stevens dissented from the Court's judgment. He
agreed with Justice Souter's analysis of the benefits of the exclu-
sionary rule in the parole revocation context.16s However, he
wrote separately to endorse former Justice Stewart's conclusion
that the exclusionary rule is "constitutionally required, not as a
'right' explicitly incorporated in the Fourth Amendment's pro-
hibitions, but as a remedy necessary to ensure that those prohi-
bitions are observed in fact."'169
V. ANALYSIS
A. WHOSE EXCLUSIONARY RULE?
In one respect, the Scott decision differs significantly from
the Court's previous decisions regarding the exclusionary rule:
neither briefed nor argued nor mentioned in the Court's opin-
ions (other than an indirect reference in Justice Stevens's dis-
sent) is a dispute about the function of the rule. The Weeks
opinion responsible for the origin of the rule viewed it as man-
dated by the Fourth Amendment, as a necessary corollary of
constitutional protections: "to sanction [illegal police conduct]
would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect if not
an open defiance of the prohibitions of the Constitution.' °
Subsequent opinions likewise regarded the rule as implicit in
the Fourth Amendment: for example, Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United State 7' argued that failing to apply the rule reduced the
Fourth Amendment to "a form of words,"172 and Byars v. United
States"' stated that "the assurance against [misuse of power] is
' Id. at 2028 (Souter,J., dissenting).
Id. (SouterJ., dissenting).
'Id. at 2022-23 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
... Id. at 2023 (Stevens, J., dissenting (quoting Stewart, supra note 52, at 1389)).
'7 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 394 (1914).
17 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
'7
2 Id. at 392.
'' 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
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not to be impaired by judicial sanction" of illegal conduct.7 4
Mapp drew extensively on these theories, stating that "[n] othing
can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to ob-
serve its own laws," 175 and referred to the theoretical basis of
Weeks as justification for the rule. 176 Mapp also referred to the
"imperative ofjudicial integrity" of Elkins, which argued that the
federal courts should not be "accomplices in the willful disobe-
dience of [the] Constitution.',7 7 Later decisions shifted the ba-
sis for applying the rule to deterrence, though: Calandra called
the rule a 'Judicially created remedy,"' 78 and Stone and Leon fol-
lowed suit.17 The new deterrence analysis eliminated judicial
complicity by arguing that the wrong to the defendant is "fully
accomplished" by the original search and seizure;' 80 admitting
the evidence therefore raises no concerns about a fresh viola-
tion of a defendant's rights. All three cases featured vigorous
dissents by Justice Brennan, who argued each time that the
Court was ignoring the real basis of the exclusionary rule and
watering down its protections by confining its value to deter-
rence. 8' The accumulated precedent from those cases seems to
have overruled the reasoning of Mapp, but preserved the sub-
stance of the decision.
It is far from clear that the Court's "fully accomplished
wrong" analysis actually addresses the real problem. For one
thing, in some situations, the wrong is not fully accomplished
'
74 Id. at 33.
'
7 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
'
76 Id. at 653.
'"Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960).
'7' United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
'79 One commentator has wondered if the loss of the constitutional basis for the
rule in these decisions has cast it into the realm of federal common law. SeeArthur G.
LeFrancois, On Exorcising the Exclusionary Demons: An Essay on Rhetoric, Principle, and the
Exclusionary Rule, 53 U. GIN. L. REV. 49, 79-80 (1984). If so, it is possible that the ex-
clusionary rule as it stands could be overruled entirely by statute, and the Court's
analysis regarding the "fully accomplished wrong" would mean that victims of illegal
searches would have no recourse.
'go Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354.
'8' See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 931-32 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 510-11 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 359-60 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also 1 LAFAVE, su-
pra note 64, § 1.6(a), at 158-59, commenting on the Calandra holding.
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when an officer seizes evidence illegally; the defendant's posses-
sory interests have been infringed, and as long as the govern-
ment retains that material, the wrong continues.18 That is,
admitting the evidence does work a new Fourth Amendment
wrong: it compounds the original violation of the defendant's
possessory rights by using the illegally seized materials to convict
him.'o If the officers draw on that evidence in order to violate
privacy interests, a wrong which is "fully accomplished" in the
sense that nothing can reverse it, then the state is using one vio-
lation of the Fourth Amendment to make another possible.'' If
courts allow the use of evidence so long as the wrong is com-
plete-i.e., the police have returned it-then that constitutes
derivative use under Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States.e In
Silverthorne, the government seized documents, then returned
them pursuant to court order-but it photocopied them before
returning them and issued subpoenas based on the photocop-
ies.'" The Court ruled that the government cannot profit by its
own wrong in those circumstances, fully accomplished or not.
8 7
It is possible, of course, to draw a distinction for Fourth
Amendment purposes between fully accomplished wrongs and
ongoing violations, but that would leave the law in an even more
incoherent state.'s A more sensible approach would draw an
analogy from the government's derivative use of illegally seized
evidence in Silverthorne to use of information obtained from a
violation of privacy, since the invasion is "fully accomplished" in
both situations, and find that admitting illegally seized evidence
is itself a violation of a defendant's rights.' 89 But theoretical co-




251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
TM Id. at 390-91.
'Id. at 392.
"'Heffernan, supra note 182, at 1239-40.
,8§ See, e.g., Thomas S. Schrock & Robert S. Welsh, Up From Calandra: The Exclusion-
ary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REv. 251, 299 (1974) (noting that
"the 'accomplishment' of the 'original search' does not exhaust the category of con-
stitutional wrongs that can occur in the course of the whole unconstitutional transac-
tion"); Stewart, supra note 52, at 1383-86. See also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
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herence in the exclusionary rule context does not seem to be
the order of the day.19'
In light of its willingness to blur distinctions like the above,
the Court seems to have abandoned judicial integrity, as articu-
lated in Elkins and elsewhere, as a basis for Fourth Amendment
decisionmaking. Calandra signaled the Court's direction when
it dismissed the integrity argument in one sentence: "Illegal
conduct is hardly sanctioned. .. by declining to make an un-
precedented extension of the exclusionary rule to grand jury
proceedings where the rule's objectives would not be effectively
served and where other important and historic values would be
unduly prejudiced."1 9' The "important and historic values" con-
sisted, in the Calandra case at least, of the continued efficiency
of the probationary system; while efficiency is important, it is
not clear why it necessarily trumps the integrity of the judiciary.
United States v. Peltie 92 mentioned the principle, but mostly in
order to characterize it as a thing of the past and confine the
permissible basis for the Court's decisions to deterrence.9 3
The notion of 'Judicial integrity" has itself come under at-
tack in some circles. United States v. Janis94 relied on Calandra's
'judicially created remedy" theory, pointing to deterrence bene-
fits as the sole justification for the rule, but went further still in
suggesting that courts overstep their bounds by applying the
rule: "there comes a time at which courts, consistent with their
duty to administer the law, cannot continue to create barriers to
law enforcement in the pursuit of a supervisory role that is
properly the duty of the Executive and Legislative Branches." 95
The dicta in Janis therefore implied that judicial integrity has
come full circle in the Court's analysis: rather than mandating
941 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment itself is the source
of the costs associated with the exclusionary rule).
"o Justice Rehnquist once observed that "the decisions of this Court dealing with
the constitutionality of warrantless searches... suggest that this branch of the law is
something less than a seamless web." Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440 (1973).
"' United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 356 n.11 (1974).
192 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
1 Id. at 536.
"' 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
, Id. at 459.
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that courts strike down illegally seized evidence, lest the judici-
ary implicitly endorse misconduct, the principle now means that
courts should avoid interfering in the executive branch process
whenever possible. Another reverse integrity argument is that
exclusion of valid evidence "undermines the reputation of and
destroys the respect for the entire judicial system,"19 implying
that the court of public opinion should prevail over Fourth
Amendment protections in this arena. Calandra and other deci-
sions suggest that judicial integrity is merely another factor to
consider in the balancing-test analysis. 97 But the function of the
judiciary is to interpret the Constitution, and the point of insu-
lating that branch from political pressures is to prevent the
Constitution from being swept aside by the whims of the day.
Whose version of judicial integrity is it that endorses official
misconduct for fear of becoming unpopular?
Shifting the justification for the rule from substantive
Fourth Amendment protections to a deterrence basis casts the
Court in a somewhat uncomfortable role. Policy decisions re-
garding what best serves the purposes of law enforcement are
better made by legislatures, or by the administrative agencies
serving the law enforcement systems; courts making such deci-
sions raise the "counter-majoritarian difficulty"'98  of an
unelected branch of government writing its preferences into
law. The arguments in Scott illustrate those problems: much of
the Court's opinion is given over to weighing the rule's benefits
to parolees' constitutional protections against its costs to society,
arguably not a decision the Court is well equipped to make9
'96 Malcolm Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62
JUDICATURE 214, 223 (1978).
LeFrancois, supra note 179, at 91 (quoting Note, Judicial Integrity and Judicial Re-
view: An Argument for Expanding the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
1129, 1153 (1973)). But seeJeffrey Cole, The Exclusionary Rule in Probation and Parole
Revocation Proceedings: Some Observations on Deterrence and the "Imperative ofJudicial Integ-
rity, "52 CH.-KENT L. REV. 21 (arguing that Elkins' principle was actually merely a pol-
icy argument).
'98 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1962). See also Wil-
liam T. Plumb, Illegal Enforcement of the Law, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 337, 375
(1939) (questioning the propriety of courts tying the hands of legislatures and execu-
tives via the exclusionary rule).
'"Justice Brennan argued as much:
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In Scott, the Court told the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that, in
fashioning a new doctrine which applied the rule in the context
of parole revocation, it had weighed those costs and benefits in-
correctly. °° The reasoning of the Scott decision raises particular
In addition, the Court's decisions over the past decade have made plain that the en-
tire enterprise of attempting to assess the benefits and costs of the exclusionary rule in
various contexts is a virtually impossible task for the judiciary to perform honestly or ac-
curately. Although the Court's language in those cases suggests that some specific em-
pirical basis may support its analyses, the reality is that the Court's opinions represent
inherently unstable compounds of intuition, hunches, and occasional pieces of partial
and often inconclusive data.
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 942 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also
United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 633-34 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing
that "this balancing effort is completely freewheeling" and that the deterrence ap-
proach "treats the Fourth and Fifth Amendments as mere incentive schemes"); Jerry
E. Norton, The Exclusionary Rule Reconsidered: Restoring the Status Quo Ante, 33 WAKE
FoiRsT L. REV. 261, 274 (1998) (arguing that "in operation the path that the Court
has set out on can only be described as adjudication by empirical hunch"). The usual
paradigm ofjudicial activism supposes a Court intent on taking power for itself in or-
der to turn its own policy preferences into law; the line of cases, continued in Scott,
that requires judges to decide whether the policy background of each situation man-
dates the exclusionary rule certainly involves judges in the process more than would a
categorical rule favoring exclusion. Many commentators have criticized judicial activ-
ism, usually defined as judges going beyond the text of statutes or of the Constitution
to make policy judgments, as usurping the role of the legislature; see, e.g., Charles B.
Blackmar, Judicial Activism, 42 ST. Louis LJ. 753 (1998); Lina A. Graglia, Constitutional
Law: A Ruse for Government by an Intellectual Elite, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 767 (1998); Ed-
win Meese IM & Rhett DeHart, Reining in the Federal Judiciary, 80 JUDICATURE 178
(1997); Michael S. Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the
Law Is, 83 GEo. LJ. 217 (1994).
Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 2022 (1998).
At the very least, this approach sits uneasily with Griffin's deference to state regula-
tions, since the Court was willing to intervene in a state's decision-and overrule the
decisions of many states-here. The Court claimed in Scott that it granted certiorari
"to determine whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies to parole
revocation proceedings," id. at 2019, but its analysis focused exclusively on the pro-
ceedings and barely mentioned the Constitution. Moreover, the Court struck down a
discretionary application of the rule to a specific context-those situations where the
investigating officer knew the suspect's status-saying that "we decline to adopt" such
an approach. That raises the question whether it was necessary to grant certiorari in
order to decline to adopt one state's rule, and whether this decision is compatible
with Justice Thomas's judicial restraint. Since a majority of state courts and federal
circuits have adopted the rule in some form, many on a basis similar to Pennsylva-
nia's, the Court's decision arguably conflicts with the general consensus on this issue.
On the other hand, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision had applied its rule
based on the federal Constitution (as well as the state constitution), so perhaps the
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concerns: the opinion arguably rested more on the social costs
analysis than on an assessment of the deterrence benefits, since
the Court devoted most of its time to the argument that the pa-
role and probationary systems would crumble beneath the
weight of the Fourth Amendment. The deterrence analysis is
somewhat less open-ended; a parole officer's incentives can at
least be estimated. But the indeterminate nature of the social
costs question-the inability of the Court to measure those
costs, analyze their anticipated effects, and judge how the rule
would affect different state systems-leaves the decision rather
opaque.
The shifting rationale for the exclusionary rule has there-
fore created a problem: the judiciary enforces a restrictive rule
governing executive decisions based on nothing in particular.
Calandra and other decisions regarding the scope of the rule
require only that courts apply the rule when the "potential con-
tribution to the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment" out-
weighs the costs involved-i.e., on a discretionary basis.201 Were
the constitutional basis for the rule set out in Weeks and reiter-
ated in Mapp still followed, that discretion would be unneces-
sary: the intent of the Mapp holding was to "close the only
courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official
lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all
persons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful
conduct."2 12 The door was, in theory, closed, not closed as long
as it served the purposes of deterrence. While the Mapp deci-
sion mentioned deterrence, it referred to that basis as an addi-
tional rationale, not as the overriding principle whose presence
determines the weight of the constitutional claim. The change
in the exclusionary rule's rationale has left the judiciary on thin
jurisprudential ice: it usurps the legislature's policymaking role
Court considered it worth its while to correct what it considered a mistaken percep-
tion of federal constitutional rights.
"' Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 487 (1976). See also United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338 (1973), in which the Court argued that "the application of the rule has been
restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously
served." Id. at 348.
' Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961). The decision also referred to the
rule as "part and parcel of the Fourth Amendment's limitations." Id. at 651.
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and restricts executive action based on its own assessments of
social policy. 203 In theory, if the Court decided tomorrow that
the exclusionary rule does not, in fact, serve the purposes of de-
terrence, it could consign it to that very crowded dustbin of his-
tory. Since admission of illegally obtained evidence does not
implicate the Constitution, Congress or any other legislature
could likewise dispose of the rule on the same basis.
Undoubtedly, many resist the exclusionary rule on princi-
ple: detractors object to a rule that more often than not allows,
injustice Cardozo's words, "the criminal to go free because the
constable has blundered. 20 4 One critic of the rule calls it an
"outrage to common sense [that] ... often results in the freeing
of someone convicted of a vicious criminal act for what strikes
the crime-conscious public as finicking or trivial reasons,"20 5 an
objection that, as one scholar says, seems "visceral rather than
cerebral." 206 But public resentment is not a sound basis for con-
stitutional decisionmaking; some say that most of the American
public would reject, if given the choice, many of the provisions
of the Bill of Rights. 20 7 In that many decisions regarding the
rule's extension have simply stated the results of a supposed
cost-benefit balancing analysis, without explanation, visceral
"" Of course, the Court has created remedies elsewhere. See, e.g., Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring that a suspect be given specific warnings before
custodial interrogation can take place). But Miranda stipulated also that the remedy
applies only insofar as no "other fully effective means are devised to inform accused
persons" of their various rights; an alternative approach would obviate the Court's sys-
tem for ensuring Fifth Amendment protections. Id. at 444. See also Henry P. Mona-
ghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 26 (1974) (defending the Court's creation of remedies to protect individual
liberties, so long as the Court does not construe the rules it creates as necessary com-
ponents of due process). The Court's decisions regarding the exclusionary rule con-
tain no such caveat. Moreover, whereas Miranda relied on a finding that the Fifth
Amendment requires substantive protection despite inherent costs, Calandra and
Stone hold that social costs define the scope of the rule, and therefore the Fourth
Amendment's protections. Scott is explicit on this point: "the rule is prudential rather
than constitutionally mandated" and "imposes significant costs.., although we have
held these costs worth bearing in certain circumstances." 118 S. Ct. 2014, 2019-20.
People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
2" Wilkey, supra note 196, at 223 n.2 (quoting Editorial, THE WASHINGTON STAR,
July 7, 1975, at Al6).
2' LeFrancois, supra note 179, at 69.
2o7 Id. at 68.
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feelings may play a part in the jurisprudence in this area as well.
Many of those claims rest on mistaken assumptions, though: the
rule that the above critic claimed "often" frees criminals actually
excluded evidence, in one federal study, in 1.3% of arrests.'08
Due process concerns, all told, were responsible for dismissing
2% of the arrests in another study.2 ° Most of the cases involve
victimless crimes, such as firearms, immigration, and narcotics
violations:210 one critic of the rule acknowledged that it "rarely
allows dangerous defendants to go free."211 The popular antipa-
thy to the rule may not, therefore, rest on considered judgment
in any sense.
The Scott decision represents the culmination of a long pro-
cess: the Court has moved from a highly theoretical defense of
Fourth Amendment rights, and an argument that 'Judicial in-
tegrity" itself demands the exclusion of illegally seized evidence,
to an argument that looks entirely to the rule's value for law en-
forcement and not at all to the language or purpose of the
Fourth Amendment.2  The facts of the Scott case illustrate that
evolution: there was no dispute over whether Fourth Amend-
ment rights were violated, but the Court was not interested in
that as long as the violation was "fully accomplished" by the ille-
gal search and not augmented by the admission of the evi-
dence. At this point, evidently, that is sufficient to satisfy the
Court.
Report by the Comptroller General of the United States, Impact of the Exclu-
sionary Rule on Federal Criminal Prosecutions 11, April 19, 1979, GGD-79-45 [here-
inafter Report].
The Exclusionary Rule Bills: Hearings on S.101, S.751, and S.1995 Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 105
(1981) (statement of William W. Greenhalgh, Chairperson, Criminal Justice Section,
Legislative Committee, American Bar Association).
Report, supra note 208, at 7.
John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1027, 1036
(1974).
211 For another view on how courts should consider the basis of the exclusionary
rule, see Norton, supra note 199 (arguing for restoration of the status quo ante as the
rule's theory).
... Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 2019




The deterrence analysis in Scott illustrates many of the prob-
lems mentioned above. The Court argued that the deterrence
to law enforcement officers provided by Pennsylvania's rule was
not sufficient to outweigh the social costs of complicating the
process."4 The Court's reasoning was questionable, though: it
dismissed the benefits as "minimal" and asserted with little
analysis that law enforcement officers do not need any addi-
215tional deterrence measures when investigating parolees.
While the Court's holding in Scott is consistent with its line
of cases restricting operation of the exclusionary rule, it takes a
distinctly different tack on deterrence issues. As noted else-
where,1 6 the Court has increasingly disregarded arguments that
the Fourth Amendment requires application of the rule, and
has instead regarded it as a judicially created remedy to be ap-
plied in those situations where the benefits would outweigh its
costs.2 1 7 Leon's adoption of a good-faith reliance standard fits
that model,218 as does Calandra's refusal to apply the rule to the
grand jury process, since such an exclusion would reduce the
possibility of bringing indictments. 1 9 But Scott's rejection of the
deterrence benefits of the rule followed no obvious logic, cer-
tainly not the reasoning of Leon or Calandra: the Court reasoned
that, "even when the officer knows the subject of his search is a
parolee, the officer will be deterred from violating Fourth
Amendment rights by the application of the exclusionary rule to
criminal trials."229 Officers who know that suspects are parolees
also know that those suspects ordinarily face parole revocation
hearings, rather than criminal trials as such. After all, why
211 Id. at 2022.
215 Id.
21 See supra notes 174-77 and accompanying text.
217 The "efficiency" argument in this context could, some argue, mean a revival of
the silver platter doctrine, in that parole officers could serve as "a front for police who
are thus saved the nuisance of getting a warrant." Ellen A. Schwartz, Do Illegal Searches
Warrant Exclusion from Probation Revocation Hearings?, 49 BROOK. L. REV. 1013, 1032
(1983) (quoting Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 242 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing)).
" Leon, 468 U.S. at 920-21.
9 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349-50 (1974).
"" Scott, 118 S. Ct. at 2022.
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would a prosecutor expend resources to try a parolee on the
substantive offense when a revocation hearing can send him to
prison far more cheaply?221 Parolees are particularly unlikely to
face prosecution when the offenses include noncriminal parole
violations, such as possessing a firearm. The Court's finding
that a parole proceeding is "outside the offending officer's zone
of primary interest!'2 2 misses the point of Pennsylvania's rule: of-
ficers who know that the ordinary Fourth Amendment restric-
tions will not disrupt the suspect's hearing may feel free to
disregard limits on search and seizure.
The Court's analysis regarding the deterrence benefits with
respect to searches conducted by parole officers is similarly un-
persuasive. The Court assumes categorically that parole officers
feel benevolence and goodwill for parolees-"their relationship
... is more supervisory than adversarial" 2 -- and it is "unfair to
assume that the parole officer bears hostility against the parolee
that destroys his neutrality., 2 4 It is no doubt unfair to assume
that in every instance; it is no more fair to assume that the pa-
role officer bears no hostility toward the parolee and on that ba-
sis entrust to him absolutely the parolee's Fourth Amendment
rights. Recognizing that the parole officer must play both
roles-policeman and counselor/social worker-might allow
for a more realistic perspective: it seems less than fair to expect
those officers to both carry out investigative work and retain a
mentoring relationship with the parolee. In that light, the
Court should have considered parole officers similar to police
officers for deterrence purposes.
Several lower court decisions have recognized the necessity
of deterrence in this context. In State v. Burkholder2 5 the court
described as "myopic" the view that suppression of illegally
seized evidence secures Fourth Amendment rights sufficiently,
contending that the "potential for abuse" inherent in the coop-
"' 1 LAFAvE, supra note 64, § 1.6(g), at 180.
2' Scott, 118 S. Ct. at 2022 (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458
(1976)).
2" id.
"2' Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1972)).
"2' 466 N.E.2d 176 (Ohio 1984).
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erative effort between police and parole officers demands strin-
gent protections. 6 Likewise, United States v. Red2 relied on the
Calandra balancing requirement and found that the deterrence
value of applying the rule in probation revocation hearings
outweighs injury to the process, since the burden of a warrant
requirement is relatively minor.2 8
The Scott majority also found that other approaches to de-
terring illegal activity by parole officers will suffice, but the evi-
dence for that appears to be thin. The Court suggested
"departmental training and discipline and the threat of dam-
ages actions, to which Justice Souter responded:
The same, of course, might be said of the police, and yet as to them
such arguments are not heard, perhaps for the same reason that the
Court's suggestion sounds hollow as to parole officers. The Court points
to no specific departmental training regulation; it cites no instance of
discipline imposed on a Pennsylvania parole officer for conducting an il-
legal search of a parolee's residence; and, least surprisingly of all, the
majority mentions not a single lawsuit brought by a parolee against a pa-
role officer seeking damages for an illegal search. In sum, if the police
need the deterrence of an exclusionary rule to offset the temptation to
forget the Fourth Amendment, parole officers need it quite as much.23
The Court's analysis in Irvine v. Calforni 2 3' reflects the same
concern. The Irvine Court found that other remedies for
Fourth Amendment violations are "of no practical avail," since
"the police are unlikely to inform on themselves or each other"
and hence any claim against the police will likely be brought by
convicted criminals.232 Mapp went so far as to call reliance on
Id. at 178.
2'7678 F.2d 382 (2d. Cir 1982).
" Id. at 389-90. Some commentators endorse this deterrence-based approach on
the part of lower courts over Fourth Amendment absolutism. See, e.g., Mark E. Opal-
isky, Note, The Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule to Probation Revocation Proceedings, 17
MEm. ST. U. L. REv. 555, 580 (1987).
Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 2022 (1998).
Id. at 2026 (SouterJ., dissenting).
'3' 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
2 Id. at 137.
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other remedies "worthless and futile.' 't 33 As criminal suspects
are unlikely to have the resources for a civil suit, and are like-
wise unlikely to win much sympathy from a jury, there is little
reason to think that civil remedies are an adequate substitute
for the exclusionary rule. M The interests harmed by Fourth
Amendment violations are often nebulous enough that proving
damages in court would be difficult.2- And whether or not in-
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652 (1961). The Wof holding had rested on the
Court's hesitation to condemn states' "reliance upon other methods which, if consis-
tently enforced, would be equally effective." Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 31 (1949).
Integral to Mapp's overruling of Wolf was the recognition of the "obvious futility" of
entrusting Fourth Amendment rights to remedies other than the exclusionary rule.
367 U.S. at 652. Many states had, in the interim between Wofand Mapp, adopted the
exclusionary rule for themselves. Id. The Scott Court's airy assumption that unspeci-
fied other remedies will remedy Fourth Amendment violations in the parole context
seems, at this late date, rather quaint.
" See Stewart, supra note 52, at 1384-88; Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S.
388, 421-22 (1971) (Burger, CJ., dissenting). ChiefJustice Burger advocates creating
a right of action against the government itself to redress illegal seizures of evidence,
which addresses the problem ofjuries' sympathy for the police but not the more fun-
damental problem of scarce resources on the part of criminal defendants. One
commentator criticized ChiefJustice Burger's suggestion as follows:
Where are the lawyers going to come from to handle these cases for the plaintiffs?
Gideon v. Wainwright and its progeny conscript them to file suppression motions; but
what on earth would possess a lawyer to file a claim for damages before the special tri-
bunal in an ordinary search-and-seizure case? The prospect of a* share in the substantial
damages to be expected? The chance to earn a reputation as a police-hating lawyer, so
that he can no longer count on straight testimony concerning the length of skid marks
in his personal injury cases? The gratitude of his client when his filing of the claim
causes the prosecutor to refuse a lesser-included-offense plea or to charge priors or to
pile on "cover" charges? The opportunity to represent his client without fee in these re-
sulting criminal matters?
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 430
(1974).
Justice Murphy's dissent in Wolfcriticized the idea of a damages action for tres-
pass as a substitute for the exclusionary rule:
But what an illusory remedy this is, if by "remedy" we mean a positive deterrent to
police and prosecutors tempted to violate the Fourth Amendment. The appealing ring
softens when we recall that in a trespass action the measure of damages is simply the ex-
tent of the injury to physical property. If the officer searches with care, he can avoid all
but nominal damages-a penny, or a dollar. Are punitive damages possible? Perhaps.
But a few states permit none, whatever the circumstances. In those that do, the plaintiff
must show the real ill will or malice of the defendant, and surely it is not unreasonable
to assume that one in honest pursuit of crime bears no malice toward the search victim.
If that burden is carried, recovery may yet be defeated by the rule that there must be
physical damages before punitive damages may be awarded .... And even if the plaintiff
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ternal disciplinary measures would accomplish the desired end,
those are administrative proceedings that the courts cannot leg-
islate or require that police departments implement.26 Law en-
forcement officers would justifiably consider any attempt along
those lines judicial overreaching. 7 There is little evidence, in
short, that other means of deterring abuses by law enforcement
are effective.
The Court's badly flawed deterrence analysis in Scott sug-
gests that its decision rests more on an assessment of the pre-
sumed costs of applying the rule than on an accurate estimation
of its benefits. And since the Court offers no empirical assess-
ment of those costs, and provides no evidence to support the as-
sertion that other available remedies can adequately protect
Fourth Amendment interests in this context, it is difficult to see
its claims about deterrence as anything other than a statement
of its conclusion.
C. WHAT IS PAROLE REVOCATION?
Integral to the decision in Scott was the argument that never
before has the Court applied the exclusionary rule to contexts
other than criminal prosecutions. Past decisions in which the
hurdles all these obstacles, and gains a substantial verdict, the individual officer's fi-
nances may well make the judgment useless-for the municipality, of course, is not li-
able without its consent. Is it surprising that there is so little in the books concerning
trespass actions for violation of the search and seizure clause?
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 42-44 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (citations omit-
ted), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
'Justice Murphy noted this problem as well:
Imagination and zeal may invent a dozen methods to give content to the com-
mands of the Fourth Amendment. But this Court is limited to the remedies currently
available. It cannot legislate the ideal system. If we would attempt the enforcement of
the search and seizure clause in the ordinary case today, we are limited to three devices:
judicial exclusion of the illegally obtained evidence; criminal prosecution of violators;
and civil action against violators in the action of trespass.
Id. at 41 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
"' Courts could, of course, require that officers conduct searches in compliance
with departmental rules, and that such rules conform to Fourth Amendment re-
quirements. See Amsterdam, supra note 234, at 416-17. But the incentive to write
such rules vaguely is strong, and courts cannot rewrite the rules should they find that
officers acting under their guidance violated suspects' rights.
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Court declined to broaden the rule to grand jury proceedings,
civil deportation proceedings, and civil tax proceedings led the
Scott Court to argue that the parole revocation process should
likewise be exempt.' Those analogies ignored the substantial
similarities between the parole revocation process and criminal
prosecutions, however, and once again assumed what they set
out to prove.
Past decisions indicate that parallels between parole revoca-
tion hearings and criminal proceedings are not so obscure. The
Scott Court characterized parole revocation as "flexible, adminis-
trative" and not "adversarial," but its holding in Morrissey sug-
gests that the adversarial process plays a substantial part.
Requiring that the parolee be permitted to call witnesses of his
own and cross-examine adverse witnesses, as Morrissey does,
draws a certain parallel to criminal proceedings. 39 Likewise, the
provision for counsel for indigent parolees in Gagnon, though it
required only that "fundamental fairness" govern the question
of appointment of counsel, suggested that the parole revocation
process can have an adversarial flavor.240 Several of the lower
court decisions applying the rule to revocation proceedings
have done so on this theory:24' in United States v. Workman,242 for
example, the court found that a probation revocation hearing
bears a stronger resemblance to a criminal trial than to a grand
jury proceeding or civil trial, since the defendant's liberty is not
endangered in the latter contexts.243 Likewise, in Amiss v. State,
244
the court concluded that the use of illegally seized evidence in a
probation revocation hearing is "no less an invasion of the con-
Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 2020 (1998).
"9 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972). It is true, of course, that prison-
ers are entitled to due process rights but not to Fourth Amendment protections, un-
der Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). However, two more recent circuit court
decisions have restricted the logic of Sandin to prisoners rather than extending it to
parolees, suggesting that the Morrissey analysis remains good law. Ellis v. District of
Columbia, 84 F.3d 1413, 1418 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 32 (5th
Cir. 1995).
2'0 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973).
2" Opalisky, supra note 228, at 573.
2 585 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1978).
4 Id. at 1210-11.
" 219 S.E.2d 28 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975).
1999] 1083
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
stitutional rights" of the defendant than use in a criminal trial
would be.2 5
The other contexts that the Court mentioned do not sup-
port its analysis. Grand jury proceedings have a special status
under law because the target of the investigation generally does
not testify; the purpose of the process is to weigh the evidence,
not to determine ultimate liability.246 Additionally, any charges
brought as a result of grand jury proceedings are subject to ex-
clusion in a subsequent criminal prosecution, so there is no real
danger associated with the relaxing of evidentiary restrictions.247
Civil deportation proceedings are only minimally related to
criminal prosecutions: they do not determine criminal liability,
traditional protections such as Miranda warnings do not apply,
and the hearing may proceed in the absence of the potential
deportee.248 The decision in United States v. Janis249 did not ad-
dress the applicability of the rule to civil tax proceedings per se,
the Janis holding turned on the deterrence rationale, since the
officer had acted in good faith,20 and on the "intersovereign"
nature of the case, since the evidence in the federal proceeding
had been seized by a state officer.251 The pronounced move-
ment on the part of state courts and federal circuits toward ap-
plying the rule in probation and parole hearings also suggests
that the parallels are more compelling than the Court's -analysis
acknowledged.
Moreover, the Court has already extended the exclusionary
rule beyond criminal prosecutions: in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan
v. Pennsylvania,22 the Court applied the rule to forfeiture pro-
ceedings, calling them "quasi-criminal."2' The Plymouth Sedan
2* Id. at 30.
216 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343-44 (1973).
217 Id. at 351.
248 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038-39 (1984).
249 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
21 Id. at 447.
2" Id. at 455-56. Indeed, the Court explicitly declined to decide whether the rule
should apply to "intrasovereign" cases, where the agent in question and the court
hearing the case were under the same government. Id. at 456.
22 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
2" Id. at 700.
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Court reasoned, relying on Boyd, that since the target of a forfei-
ture hearing is charged with the commission of a crime and the
purpose of the proceeding is to determine whether he has vio-
lated the law, the exclusionary rule must apply.24 Parole revoca-
tion hearings likewise adjudicate guilt or innocence, though not
all violations are actual crimes, and the parolee's liberty hangs
in the balance. The subjects of forfeiture proceedings, like pa-
rolees, must be afforded due process rights of notice and an
opportunity to be heard;25 the consequences for violations of
the law are loss of property in the one instance and loss of lib-
erty in the other. The Court, conveniently, did not mention
Plymouth Sedan in Scott, but the parallels between the two con-
texts are striking.
Parole officers serve much the same purpose as police offi-
cers, and treating them differently ignores the realities of the
process. 6 Parole officers are permitted to investigate alleged
violations, by searching the parolee's person and residence.
Though they play a "supervisory" function, they are also re-
quired to enforce the restrictive conditions governing parole
and take the parolee into custody should he violate the condi-
tions. Moreover, as Justice Souter observed, even though parole
officers sometimes play the role of counselor and social worker,
the expectation that they monitor parolees and take them into
custody should they violate their parole conditions means that
they must play adversary as well. 7 Viewing parole revocation as
an administrative rather than adversarial process, because pa-
role officers are in charge, is therefore unrealistic. It also ig-
nores that ordinary police officers often assist parole officers in
their enforcement duties, police officers who are not necessarily
tuned to the supposedly nonadversarial process of parole revo-
cation.2s5 Learning about and seizing evidence of alleged viola-
tions is a crucial element in the revocation process, after all.
" Id. at 701.
United States v.James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 48 (1993).
2' Pennslyvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 2025
(1998) (Souter, J., dissenting).
2'7 Id. at 2026 (Souter,J. dissenting).




The Scott Court, along with fumbling its factual analysis,
looked past its own precedent on one important point. The
rule that the Court rejected in Scott mirrored, in several signifi-
cant respects, the "good faith" exception upheld in United States
v. Leon, and the Court ignored the obvious parallels in striking
down Pennsylvania's proposal.
The similarities between Leon and Pennsylvania's rule are
evident. Under the Leon Court's analysis, "[w]here the police
officer's conduct is objectively reasonable . . . 'excluding the
evidence can in no way affect his future conduct."'' 9 In some
circumstances, however, "the officer will have no reasonable
grounds to believe that the warrant was properly issued," and
the Court's deterrence calculus required that evidence pro-
duced by those searches be excluded .2  The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court's rule likewise looked to situations where there was
specific evidence of bad faith-for example, where a law en-
forcement officer, knowing that a suspect was unlikely to face a
criminal prosecution, violated his Fourth Amendment rights. 61
Such evidence would be objectively assessable; no inquiring into
motivations would be necessary.
The parole revocation context particularly recommends it-
self to a good-faith standard. Much of the process, as the Scott
Court acknowledged, is not subject to the constraints of ordi-
nary criminal proceedings: the "flexible" standards applicable to
revocation hearings would seem to demand the likewise "flexi-
ble" requirement that officers show good-faith compliance with
the Fourth Amendment. Since Scott had waived the warrant
requirement-and since, under Griffin, he was probably not en-
titled to a warrant anywayn-his rights were subject to the whims
of the officers; Leon looked to the "detached scrutiny of a neu-
tral magistrate 262 and declared that good faith reliance on a de-
" United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919-20 (quoting Stone, 428 U.S. at 539-40
(WhiteJ., dissenting)).
210 Id. at 922-23.
26' Scott v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole, 698 A.2d 32, 38 (Pa. 1997).
2' Leon, 468 U.S. at 913 (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977)).
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fective warrant justifies admitting the evidence, 26 but Scott had
no such safeguard. Given the extent of parolees' waivers of
their rights, an officer who nonetheless manages to violate
Fourth Amendment protections in the case of a parolee has
likely crossed the bounds that Leon set, namely whether a "rea-
sonably well trained" officer could execute a defective warrant
without noticing that anything was amiss .26 Again, Scott's case is
illustrative: extending a search of a bedroom to the common ar-
eas of a home transgresses obvious and well-known limitations
on the scope of a search, suggesting that the officers extended
that search because they knew that parolees have diminished
privacy protections. The very nature of the search, in short,
suggests bad faith-but not for the Court.
In one sense, the Pennsylvania rule represented the obverse
of the Leon condition: it sought to exclude evidence where there
was clear evidence of bad faith, rather than seeking to include
evidence when the officer acted in good faith. Arguably,
though, the former is less constitutionally troubling, in that it
compromises the courts less, makes them less an accomplice to
official misconduct. Moreover, bad faith is, in this case, more
objectively discernible than good faith: knowledge of a parolee's
status will be obvious in the case of a parole officer's violation,
and scarcely less obvious if a police officer has cooperated with
or contacted the parole board regarding a parolee's alleged vio-
lations. In either case, the deterrence argument is clear: man-
dating exclusion of illegally seized evidence discourages officers
from crossing Fourth Amendment boundaries. The Pennsylva-
nia rule would make the officer's knowledge paramount, admit-
tedly a potentially troublesome complication, but the Court
seemed willing enough to take on such a complication in Leon.
In fact, the Scott Court worried about the "additional layer of
collateral litigation" that the Pennsylvania rule would add,2  as if
establishing that a parole officer knew about a parolee's status
actually represents something more complicated than determin-
"'Id. at 908.
2" id. at 923.
'Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 2022 (1998).
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ing, under Leon, whether a warrant was defective and whether a
well-trained officer would have recognized as much.26
The Court missed the parallels in the Pennsylvania rule to
its own decision in Leon, failing to assess adequately the relative
value of deterrence. The Court did not consider, in either case,
the notion of systemic deterrence thatJustice Brennan raised in
his Leon dissent, meaning the necessity to deter not only viola-
tions by individual officers, but also to forestall indifference to
parolees' rights on the part of magistrates who issue warrants,
for example. 267 Nor, apparently, did it understand the irony of
dismissing as "marginal" the deterrence benefits of a rule that
mirrored almost exactly its own precedent.2"8 Rather than apply-
ing the Leon analysis consistently, therefore, the Court used its
analysis of parolees' and probationers' Fourth Amendment
rights to trump the deterrence arguments regarding the utility
of the exclusionary rule.
E. PAROLEES AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Dubious as the analytical basis of Scott seems, the decision
does reflect prevailing trends in the Court's jurisprudence re-
garding the Fourth Amendment rights of probationers and pa-
rolees. Moreover, it is likely, in light of precedent, that the
Court would have found the search of Scott's residence consti-
tutional had it reached that issue, even without explicit consent
or a law clearly authorizing the officers to search common areas
of the residence. In short, Scott was likely to lose either way.
The precise extent of parolees' and probationers' rights has
been debated in recent years. Mempa stated, and Morrissey af-
firmed, that defendants in revocation hearings are not entitled
26 Leon, 897 U.S. at 923. See also William J. Mertens & Silas Wasserstrom, The Good
Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70
GEo. LJ. 365 (1981), noting that implementing a good faith exception could be a
major drain on court resources: "If [a police officer] is permitted to call these wit-
nesses [to make the case for good faith], then present suppression hearings, which
opponents of the exclusionary rule criticize for consuming precious court time, will
seem positively fleeting by comparison." Id. at 448.
217 Leon, 468 U.S. at 956-58 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
'" Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 118 S. Ct. 2014,2021 (1998).
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to the rights guaranteed ordinary citizens:20 instead, the liberty
deprived is "conditional., 270 But the Morrissey opinion did not go
on to declare that parolees' rights are defined by the parole
agreement they sign; instead, the opinion set out due process
restrictions on the revocation process, detailing the procedures
required for such a process to be constitutional.21 Though Mor-
rissey took pains to note that "there is no interest on the part of
the State in revoking parole without any procedural guarantees
at all,, 272 its opinion regarding those guarantees was not simply
advisory: the argument made it clear that these are constitu-
tional requirements, not conditional on anything.
2 3
The holding in Griffin v. Wisconsin, though it superficially
relied on Morrissey's theory and addressed a separate area of the
law, in fact changed the landscape significantly. By abandoning
the warrant and probable cause requirements as inconsistent
with Wisconsin's "special needs, 274 the Griffin majority subordi-
nated Fourth Amendment rights to efficiency. Supervision of
parolees is a state interest, and giving substance to parolees'
Fourth Amendment rights by requiring warrants and probable
cause for a search might, fretted the Griffin court, hamper that
interest.275  The new standard required only "reasonable
grounds" for suspicion, and left unresolved what grounds were
reasonable: it established a balancing test between the require-
ments of the probation system and the probationer's Fourth
Amendment rights.276 The dangers of the Court's approach to
"reasonableness" are twofold. First, as the dissent argues hap-
2" Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480
(1972).
27 Morissey, 408 U.S. at 480.
2' Id. at 483-44.
272 Id. at 483.
2 3 Id. at 482.
2" Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875 (1987).
27' Id. at 876-78.
27 Id. at 873. Griffin's creation of a highly nebulous balancing test-weighing the
interests of a state's probation system is difficult-is ironic, since Justice Scalia, author
of the majority opinion, has elsewhere criticized overreliance on such tests. See, e.g.,
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 98 (1997); Board of Cty. Commissioners v. Northlake,
518 U.S. 668 (1996)(Scalia, J., dissenting); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515
(1996) (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
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pened in Griffin, officers may carry out a search "pursuant to"
regulations that satisfy the Fourth Amendment, but not actually
satisfy the requirements of those regulations.f 7 Second, many
courts have responded to Griffin's "reasonableness" requirement
by defining the terms of the parole agreement as setting the
bounds for reasonableness, 7s which in turn encourages parole
boards to require that parolees consent to warrantless searches,
whether based on reasonable suspicion or not. It takes no great
imaginative leap to suppose that parolees and probationers will
consent to conditions that dramatically reduce their rights,
since such agreements are hardly subject to negotiation.2 The
argument that the probation system would be unacceptably dis-
rupted by the application of the rule suggests that the proba-
tionary and parole systems are so fragile that only through
illegal methods can they function effectively.28° Moreover, it
proves too much to argue that the societal costs of failing to in-
carcerate parole violators are too great to justify exclusion. The
costs of applying the rule to criminal prosecutions are far
greater, after all, considering the relative numbers of parole
' Id. at 887 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).2 
,Hemmens & Del Carmen, supra note 18, at 34. See People v. Reyes, 961 P.2d 984
(Cal. 1998) (when involuntary search conditions are properly imposed, reasonable
suspicion is not required); State v. Zeta Chi Fraternity, 696 A.2d 530 (N.H.
1997) (probation condition allowing a probation officer to perform unannounced
warrantless searches is constitutional), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 558 (1997); State v.
Benton, 695 N.E.2d 757 (Ohio 1997) (random searches are constitutionally permissi-
ble if included in the agreement).
' The Court has, of course, developed a doctrine of unconstitutional conditions,
under which no state can require that a citizen waive his constitutional rights in order
to receive a discretionary benefit, such as public employment, when those rights are
unrelated to the benefit. See, e.g., Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of
Equalization of Cal., 451 U.S. 648 (1981); Sherbert v. Vertner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963);
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). But Giffin held that reasonableness alone
governs probationers' rights because the state has "special needs" at stake and be-
cause supervision of probationers is an important state interest. If states may require
a parolee or probationer to submit to warrantless searches without probable cause,
that suggests that protesting a parole agreement under the unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine is unlikely to impress the Court. There may be an outer limit-there
may be conditions that a state cannot impose on parolees-but it is not obvious where
that limit lies.
"0 1 LAFAVE, supra note 64, §1.6 (g), at 183.
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revocations and criminal proceedings, but courts still apply the
rule to evidence seized in a criminal prosecution.8 '
The implications of the Court's rejection of the Pennsylva-
nia rule are troubling. If the exclusionary rule is not to be ap-
plied in revocation hearings in settings where the offending
officer knew the suspect's status, there is a tacit acknowledg-
ment that police may apply two different standards in conduct-
ing investigations, depending on whether or not the target is a
parolee. Law enforcement uses the tools given to it; explicitly
removing Fourth Amendment protections effectively gives po-
lice carte blanche to infringe on those rights. Illuminating in this
regard is this quote by New York City Deputy Police Commis-
sioner Leonard Reisman after the Mapp decision:
The Mapp case was a shock to us. We had to reorganize our think-
ing, frankly. Before this, nobody bothered to take out search warrants.
Although the U.S. Constitution requires warrants in most cases, the U.S.
Supreme Court had ruled that evidence obtained without a warrant-il-
legally if you will-was admissible in state courts. So the feeling was, why
bother?=
Likewise, the officer who ordered the search of Scott's resi-
dence, when asked about the guidelines under which he con-
ducted the search, replied that "any individual under the
supervision of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole
can have his residence searched by representatives of the Board
with or without the homeowner's permission,"211 which suggests
that parole officers are quite aware of the Supreme Court's ju-
risprudence on parolees' rights. The claim that the rehabilita-
tive process must be preserved is likewise unimpressive: the
Court has already acknowledged, in Morrissey and Gagnon, that
parole and probation revocation proceedings have an adversary
element.
284
"' Id. at 182.
"2 Stewart, supra note 52, at 1386 (quoting N.Y. TIMES, April 28, 1965, at 50).
Scott v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole, 668 A.2d 590, 597 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1995), aftd, 698 A.2d 32 (Pa. 1997), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 2014 (1998).
"4 1 LAFAvE, supra note 64, § 1.6 (g), at 183-84.
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Under Griffin, the Scott search would likely be constitutional.
Scott consented to a warrantless search by probation officers,
making any evidence seized thereby admissible. 285 There was no
mention of "reasonableness" in the parole conditions: the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision drew on prior Pennsyl-
vania decisions that set independent standards for reasonable-
ness, specifically that the search must be based on reasonable
suspicion and be reasonably related to the parole officer's
duty.286 The court went on to say that an officer's knowledge
that a suspect is a parolee mandates the exclusionary rule, since
the balance of interests favors exclusion in those circum-
28
stances. 87 That approach conflicts with Griffin's "reasonable
grounds" test, however, since an officer's reasonable or unrea-
sonable basis for suspicion is unaffected by his knowledge of a
parolee's status. Specifically, the court introduced an absolute
bar to admission of evidence into an area where the Court had
implicitly ruled against such restrictions; moreover, since Griffin
had looked to Wisconsin state regulations for reasonableness,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Scott raised the
possibility that upholding that decision would disrupt state pro-
bationary and parole systems whose regulations, under the
Court's Griffin analysis, were presumptively reasonable.288
Though the search exceeded the bounds of the parole agree-
ment somewhat, the officers did conduct it "pursuant to" the
' Scott v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole, 698 A.2d 32, 32-33 (Pa. 1997),
rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 2014 (1998). The search of the home's common areas as well as
Scott's bedroom violated the scope of the agreement, to be sure, but broadening the
scope of the parole conditions would eliminate that problem. Griffin had already es-
tablished that a parole board can demand that a parolee sign away his rights; the Scott
holding means that, in the event that the agreement leaves some rights intact, officers
need not worry about violating them.
26 Id. at 35.
2'7 Id. at 38.
21 Some find the decline of Morrissey, as indicated in Griffin, Olim, and now Scott, a
worrisome trend. As one scholar put it:
The fundamental question, then, is whether a society in which the state has the power to
summarily reimprison several million conditional releasees without a meaningful hear-
ing is one that is compatible with civilized norms of democracy and equal citizenship
and is justifiable on policy grounds.
Bamonte, supra note 87, at 158.
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reasonable agreement that Scott consent to warrantless searches
of his home, following the Griffin logic. Not bound by Pennsyl-
vania's precedents governing the reasonableness of searches,
the Court might well have simply found that Scott consented to
a search of the common areas as well as his own room.28 The
"waiver" theory of parole, though not a part of Griffin's analysis,
reemerged somewhat in Scott when the Court reasoned that ex-
cluding evidence would permit a parolee "to avoid the conse-
quences of his noncompliance" with the parole conditions.m
That reasoning suggests that, as far as the Court is concerned,
the parolee may perfectly well waive his Fourth Amendment
rights.2' (Not considered, however, and particularly relevant in
Scott, was the effect on others living with a parolee: has the pa-
rolee waived their Fourth Amendment rights too?)2 2 The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court's decision declared that the federal
Constitution sets a definite limit on searches conducted on pa-
rolees and probationers, reversing the reasoning established in
Morrissey and Giffin that states' asserted needs trump individual
rights in this area. As such, it defied the Court's precedent.
The reach of the exclusionary rule mirrors the reach of
procedural rights in general. It would be futile to continue to
apply a constitutional provision designed to enforce the Fourth
Amendment in a context where, by implication, the Fourth
Amendment's protections are not fully applicable. The Court's
rulings on the low level of constitutional protections owed to
probationers and parolees therefore led to the holding in Scott.
2 The Court's decisions have upheld as "reasonable" warrantless searches incident
to lawful searches. See, e.g., NewYork v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
29 Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 2020 (1998).
29 Id. at 2020. The Court also says that "the State is willing to extend parole only
because it is able to condition it upon compliance with certain requirements," pre-
sumably meaning consent to warrantless searches. Id. This again raises the specter of
a bargaining process where all the leverage is on one side.
' See, e.g., The Supreme Court 1997 Term-Leading Cases: Fourth Amendment-Exclu-
sionay Rule-Parole Revocation Hearings, 112 HARV. L. REv. 182, 191 (1998) (observing





In Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, the Court
once again chose to narrow the scope of the exclusionary rule,
concerned about the potential social costs inherent in barring
the introduction of illegally obtained evidence. Brushed aside
were concerns that the rule is needed to deter abuses by law en-
forcement, and overruled was a state's approach that had sub-
stantial, support both in the decisions of other jurisdictions and
in the Court's own rulings. The result not only fits uncomforta-
bly with some of the Court's past decisions, but also seemed to
misunderstand the very nature of the parole revocation process.
Yet, given already-existing restrictions on parolees' privacy rights
that the Court could not justifiably overrule in this case, the
holding in Scott was perhaps inevitable, and raised hard ques-
tions about whether the Court's decisions give law enforcement
too much latitude in the interest of allowing states to supervise
parolees.
Duncan N. Stevens
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